THE CHRONICLES OF A CAPITALIST LAWYER

RANDOM THOUGHTS OF A CAPITALIST LAWYER ON LAW, ECONOMICS, AND EVERYTHING ELSE

  • Once Again, In Defense of Vote Buying


    A week ago, I wrote about using vote buying mechanism to prevent political parties from buying our votes. You can see the article here. Furthermore, there is also an article from Greg Mankiw and Michael Sandel in 2007 on why vote buying should not be allowed. Before I update my proposal, I'll give some comments to Mankiw and Sandel's ideas.

    The Inherent Problem of Mankiw and Sandel Cases
     
    The main argument of Mankiw is that vote buying can produce externalities to third parties. I guess there's a grain of truth in his idea, but unfortunately, his example does not make any sense at all. I reproduce his case here for ease or reference:

    "Suppose three voters are deciding whether to provide a public good that costs $9, which would be financed by a $3 tax on each voter. Andy values the public good at $8, while Ben and Carl do not value it at all. Under majority voting, Ben and Carl vote against, and the public good does not get provided, which is the efficient outcome.

    Suppose, however, that Andy could buy Ben's vote for $4. He could then ensure the project gets passed. Andy is better off by $1 (the $8 benefit minus the $3 tax and the $4 price of the vote), Ben is better off by $1 (the $4 price of the vote minus the $3 tax), and Carl is worse off by $3 (the $3 tax). The Andy-Ben vote deal has negative externalities on Carl."

    What's the main problem of his case above that can be answered by public choice theory? His case stops at the fact that Carl is worse off by $3. If Carl is a rational person, what would he do? He can also offer to purchase Ben's votes for $2, after all, losing $2 dollar is better than losing $3 and for Ben, receiving $2 is surely more attractive than receiving a net benefit of $1 from Andy.

    Then what will Andy do? He can choose to increase his offer to $5 for Ben's vote and therefore receives no benefit from the policy. At this point, Andy's marginal cost equals his marginal benefit, it's the point where he should stop because any further increase on the price of Ben's vote will cause losses to him. What would be the proper response of Carl? He can stop, or he can also choose to offer $3 dollar for Ben's vote. It's the same for him both ways, if he stops, he will lose $3 anyway, so he still has the incentive to offer such $3 (marginal cost equals marginal benefit). Now, if Andy is rational, he will stop, because he knows that proceeding with the vote buying battle will only end up with further losses. How about Carl, should he pay Ben? No, because his offer is basically only valid when Andy still wants to buy Ben's vote. There is no need for him to pay Ben if in the end Carl cancels his plan. Of course you can say that under this circumstance, Andy will come again to offer Ben to sell his votes. True, but then Carl can also do the same and a problem of cycling will be created.

    Sandel's argument is more persuasive, he shows that it is possible for Andy to actually persuade Ben to establish a value for the proposal and therefore he will vote in favor of Andy's proposal without having Andy to buy Ben's vote. In this case, Sandel argues that the end result will be the same for both cases (involving vote buying or not), there will be some costs imposed to Carl. However, even in this case, Carl can always offer to buy Ben's vote for a price.

    Sandel says that suppose Ben values the proposal for $4 after hearing Andy's persuasion, meaning that he will reap a benefit of $1 if he vote for the proposal. What can Carl do? Of course, he will offer Ben $2. What will then Andy do? He can offer a price of $5 to buy Ben's vote and then Carl will offer Ben a price of $3, and Andy will face the same problem again. Another cycling will be made in Sandel's case.

    The simple problems created by Mankiw and Sandel actually resemble the real political life. It's a case of battle between interest groups where benefits will be spread to the majority by imposing costs to a group (wide spread benefit vs narrow cost). Of course, the group will not just sit and wait for the impeding doom. They will fight for their right and if they have to lose something, they will make sure that at least it shouldn't exceed their total expected costs should the problematic policy is promulgated. I'll deal with this issue in another post. Now, let's return to my further elaborated proposal.

    The Elaborated Proposal for Vote Buying

    Since I'm still in favor of vote buying for Indonesia, I'll try to elaborate more my original proposal in this post. Further comments and questions will be much appreciated.

    The basic principle is that in a general election, voting is the commodity, people are the sellers, and political parties are buyers. Now, what's the main reason for political parties to buy our votes? Assuming that these guys are rational, I would say that they buy our votes on the basis that the expected benefits that they will reap after they secure a position are still bigger than the total expected costs that they will incur during the election. The costs can include campaign costs and any penal sanctions that may be imposed to them if they're caught (vote buying is still illegal in Indonesia).

    However, as I've said numerous times, you can't separate law from the legal enforcement. In our country, it is safe to assume that the probability of being caught and sentenced for vote buying is quite slim, meaning the costs of getting caught is not that big and therefore there is less incentive for complying with the law. In this case my proposal would be: vote buying should be legalized, any political parties are allowed to actually come to us and offer a price for our vote. This is the basic proposal, but to ensure that it can work, I'll add some additional rules.

    1. Minimum Price Cap

    There should be a minimum price cap for our votes which reflects the expected benefits of the political parties should they win the election. I would say though that since the number of Indonesian citizens are very huge, increasing a little bit of the price of our votes would have significant financial impact to our political parties in case we can't assess their expected benefits (so at least we impose higher costs to them). Say that the current market price of our vote is around Rp50,000 per vote and then we increase that to Rp55,000 per vote. Assuming that there will be at least 100 million voters, an increase of Rp5,000 per vote is equal to an additional total costs of Rp500,000,000,000 or around US$55,000,000.

    2. Bidding System

    We can choose two systems to sell our votes. The first is by using the rule of Tullock Auction  (Gordon Tullock is a famous public choice theorist), where all political parties can bid for our votes and the highest bidder will win all of our votes, however, the ones who lose the bid will also be required to actually pay the amount that they have offered during the bid process to us. 

    Second, we can use a system where each political party can bid for our votes by paying us directly, but: (i) they are required to disclose the amount publicly (or we can ask the media to do that), (ii) they are required to deposit a non-refundable minimum amount to us for their offering (say 10-15% of the offer price); (iii) there would be no legal guarantee that the voter will vote in accordance with the bid winner, meaning, the winning political party can't go to the court to enforce their right to be voted by us, and (iv) the political parties can always change their offering to us until the date we walk to the election booth and set our vote.

    You may say that the above system is crazy, no one would like to enter into this kind of arrangement where the seller position is absolute. But that is precisely why we need to adapt this kind of system. In the current system, it is very hard to prove that political parties are involved in money politics. Have you ever considered the costs imposed to us for all of these hidden money politics and also the total costs of the national and general elections (all of those disputes in the Constitutional Court and the re-elections)? Not only it's a waste of tax payers money, it also does not provide us with the best candidates to lead our country.

    Under my proposed system, there would be less incentives for political parties to buy our votes. Why? First, we eliminate small parties by this system, leaving all the major parties in a competition to rule us all. Second, unless there is a super political party with infinite source of funds, no one will ever win the vote bidding.

    Let me tell you how this will work in practice by using an assumption that there are 3 parties, A, B, and C and that each party has more or less the same financial condition. Each of A, B, and C would have the incentives to win the election because they know that they can win the election by money and that the losing party will most likely lose everything. Since they all know the other party prices, they will continuously try to outbid the other party until they exhaust all of their money, creating a cycling problem. Of course in this case, A can make a coalition with B to defeat C in the vote bidding, but C can also offer B to instead cooperate with it and defeat A. Another infinite cycling will also be created here.

    Furthermore, since there is no guarantee that people will vote for they who pay the most, there are incentives for these parties to offer things other than money to induce people to vote them and I'm quite certain that there would be no case where we end up with an absolute winner after the vote bidding fight just because it pay the most.

    Their only solution is to actually agree to stop using money and induce voters to vote them for other reasons. True that under this regime, there would always be an incentive to betray such agreement, but since it will create another cycling problem, they will be forced to comply. Suppose A, B and C agree that they will not use money to buy our votes. Then, B realizes since it is still legal to buy our votes, they can try to buy our votes behind A and C. A and C, fearing something might happen behind their back, will start to have the same incentives and will also return to money politics. You see where this is going? So the conclusion is clear: stop using money to buy our votes or end up being caught in an infinite vicious cycle.

    Of course this is not a bullet proof mechanism, if A, B, and C have a very stable coalition, we would be in big trouble. But I guess that would not happen in Indonesia, after all , no groups of robbers will ever have a stable coalition since each of them would try to maximize their own benefits on the expense of others. For further readings, try searching in Google for Arrow's Impossibility Theorem.
  • You Think Our Legislators Suck? There's a Good Explanation For That!


    If there is only one thing that I can be confident about Indonesia, that must be the notion that most Indonesian citizens hate their legislators. How couldn't we? We rarely (read: never) hear any good news about them, and we oftenly (read: all the time) hear about how irresponsible they are with their job. Remember how they lavishly spend the state budget for their ridiculous comparative study in foreign countries? How they plan to build a new potentially (read: absolutely) useless new building? How they can't meet their yearly target for issuing new laws? (though considering their capabilities, this might be a bless in disguise)

    Before you're planning for a bloody revolution, try to think about it again. Aren't these legislators the product of our beloved democracy? After all, it's the people who vote them as our representatives. But why do they betray their own constituents? It seems as if they only think about themselves or the interest of certain minority groups who have the means and funds to purchase these legislators voices in the house of representative. In reality, these interest groups don't have enough voices to put the legislators in their current position. Yet, it's clear that these groups have more control over the legislators compared to the majority of the people, i.e. us. How could that be? Should we say that democracy is a total failure? Will we have a better chance under the rule of a benevolent dictator?

    The Problem of Collective Action
     
    Public Choice theory has a very good answer for this problem (by the way, public choice theory is basically the application of economic analysis into political theory). In short, we are facing the problem of collective action, which can be further elaborated into three main issues: (i) high transaction costs, making coordination within a large group almost impossible, (ii) free rider issue within uncoordinated group, keeping people from working together (creating a vicious cycle along the way), and (iii) internalization of the interest groups' costs among a lot of people tends to lower the average costs that must be borne by each individual, giving less incentive for the people to fight back. Let's discuss this one by one.  

    In general, we, the people, are pretty much diversified. There are too many scattered interests and the costs for coordinating us into a single systematic group where each person knows perfectly other people needs, would be too expensive. Unfortunately, the case is different with interest groups. Because they are smaller in numbers, it is easier for them to coordinate among themselves, meaning less transaction costs to work together in order to satisfy their interests. This might seem obvious and logical but most people tend to underestimate this important factor. Why do you think we embrace the idea of decentralization?

    Without any effective mechanism for coordination, surely it would be very difficult for the majority to fight back. Here is where the free rider issue arises. Suppose you really want to fight back the legislators and the interest groups, you want to show them that the people are not toys to play with. To do this, you plan to invest your money in making an awareness campaign, letting people know that their legislators suck and that we can't let that happen anymore in the next election. But just when you're about to cash your check, you start to think, "wait, if I'm putting my money now, will many people agree with me and support my effort, or will they just enjoy the fruit of my efforts by doing nothing?" Unless you're a saint or you have your own interest group, you'll probably reconsider your decision and then you will wait for other people to start the effort. See the vicious cycle here?

    Finally, there is a major issue of cost internalization. When interest groups and our legislators are making policies that benefit themselves, they impose additional social costs to the rest of the people. Imagine the wasted tax money that they use for unnecessary spending, or imagine the additional burden that consumers will need to pay when interest groups, say in the form of pollutants, can induce the legislators to let them free from being responsible for the externalities caused by them to the society. Yet, since these additional costs are imposed upon a diversified group, most of the people only bear a fraction of the costs. Not to mention that these costs can also be internalized for a long term, lowering the burden to the each individuals. The end result? Less incentives for the majority to fight back since they don't feel the impact as a whole. If they do, they would have done something to prevent the interest groups and the legislators from doing whatever they want. The above things may explain why we had a "successful" reformation (read: revolution) in 1998, but not nowadays.

    One Crazy Solution: Why Don't We Sell Our Votes?
     
    So what can we do? Firstly, we need to understand how the majority of Indonesian people view the voting process and how interest groups and legislators perceive the benefit of their position. Do Indonesian people take voting as an important matter or they consider it as a commodity that they can sell for certain price? Furthermore, how do the majority of our legislators perceive their position? For the greater good of the society or for their own benefit (calculating the benefits of having the position minus the costs of getting appointed).

    If the latter is correct, the solution would be to impose an excessive price for people's votes. My main idea is: rather than imposing a sanction for political parties which try to manipulate the vote by using money, give the freedom to them to use their money as they like. Why? In a country where the price of a vote is cheap and the legal authorities are weak, there is no way for a clean political party to win against those who use money in their campaign (money is real, talk is cheap). Having said that, why don't we say to the people that they should vote for whoever can purchase their votes for the highest price (of course there should be a minimum cap for such price reflecting as close as possible the benefit that the legislators might receive from getting the position, e.g payment from interest groups).

    The more expensive the vote is, the better. The expected results are: (i) interest groups and political parties will be forced to exhaust their own resources for wasteful acts, i.e. spending a lot of money though there will be only one winner, and (ii) along with the increase in costs of buying votes, less interest groups will join the game since the expected benefits are going down to almost nothing. Through this solution, we're imposing a collective action problem to the political parties. They might work well as a single group, but if we put them in a situation where the most optimal way to reduce their costs is to not paying anyone, they will also face the same problem that larger groups face.

    Let's see how my solution work. If parties continue to pay for getting their votes, some of the smaller parties will soon realize that it is not worth it and stop playing. At this stage, it is safe to assume that the remaining players are the major ones. You may think, now we're doomed, we have major players controlling the game and no one can fight it. Not necessarily! These major players have two options: (i) they can continue to compete in spending a lot of money for getting votes or (ii) they can reach a mutual consensus that no one will use money in their campaign. Of course since none of them can trust each other (collective action problem), they will continue to spend their money to the extent that they will have no more resources to spend. In the end, when they have exhausted all of their resources, they will be forced not to use money anymore in their campaign or they will face the risk of having a vicious cycle of unnecessary money spending.

    Suggestions and comments are welcomed.

  • Knowing the Law vs Complying with the Law


    Yesterday morning, I had a nice discussion with one of my juniors in the Faculty of Law, University of Indonesia, @najmulaila, concerning the concept of legal awareness. The basic case is quite simple, she's complaining about the law students' attitude who make a right turn within the faculty, despite knowing that it is clearly prohibited. She further argued that it's useless to talk about legal compliance in Indonesia if these students don't follow the rules themselves. After all, according to her, what's the purpose of knowing the laws, if you don't comply with them? Suffice to say, she is a proponent of legal awareness campaign, i.e. having more awareness of the law should be translated into an increase in legal compliance.

    Here where I quickly have a different opinion. Knowing the law does not necessarily mean that you will comply with such law. The reason is simple and can be traced back to the basic assumption of Law and Economics, people are rational being and they respond to incentives. From the fact that most students violate the no-turning-right rule, I can conclude that the Faculty has not imposed any sanctions to the violators. No sanctions means no costs to these students to violate the rule. Hence, what are the incentives for them to comply? Surely we can't assume that these young students are those "righteous people" who will follow the law simply because it is the right thing to do as depicted in legal philosophy course. Plato always dreams of having a philosopher as the king because he exactly knows that it is impossible to have such king in the real world.

    Of course, being a diligent law student, she didn't immediately agree with me and instead offered another argument: my line of thinking is the same with corruptors! They corrupt because they know that the benefit of corruption is bigger than the costs (such as going to the prison). I almost shouted "EUREKA" when she actually said that because it is precisely what I have argued before in some of my posts (here and here). This is how Law and Economics explains the behavior of criminals, they calculate the costs and benefits of their criminal acts and whenever they decide that the benefits exceed the costs, they will most likely conduct the crime.

    If we think it through, assuming that knowing the law will increase legal compliance is a dangerous assumption, because it is a highly misguided assessment of human behavior, and there are many consequences to such assumption. Take the law students case as an example. You can always say to them how humiliating their act is, but unless the Faculty takes a real action toward the violators or unless making a right turn will cause the students to be involved in a serious accident, I bet that the rate of violations will never decrease significantly. What do you expect? Are these students hypocrites? I don't think so. They are mere human.

    Another example: it is possible that the people who understand the law can find a leeway and use such understanding for their own benefits which of course is not in line with our hope that increasing their awareness will induce them to comply with the law. So what should we do?  The answer is better legal enforcement! Legal enforcement should never be separated from the law itself.

    You can make the best law in the world, but if you have no one to enforce it, such law would be meaningless. This is especially true when you are trying to regulate people's behavior. Oliver Wendell Holmes correctly pointed out that people are only interested with what judges will do with the law. In other words, people are more interested to know what legal authorities will decide against them in certain cases and not only what the law say.

    By this, I'm not talking only about criminal law, this is applicable for any subject of law. Suppose there is a law saying that certain contracts are prohibited and will be deemed void by operation of law if people entered into such contracts. If people know that the judges will declare these contracts null and void whenever the parties bring them to the court, they will most likely not sign these contracts in the first place.

    So there we have it, a short discussion on how we should take a look at the law. One important thing that I learn from Law and Economics: some of the concepts are so obvious that people tend to disregard them entirely. At least that's the experience of Ronald Coase and his concept of Transaction Cost. The concept was made when he's still in his 20s and yet, he received his Nobel Prize in his 80s. It took 60 years for people to realize a concept that is so obvious to everyone if they think it through. Ain't that crazy?
  • The Future of Law and Economics (Collection of Essays)


    This is too important to be not posted in my blog, a series of important essays by law professors of the University of Chicago Law School on the future of law and economics program. Enjoy!
  • The Tale of the Evil Car Company (Part 2 - Proposed Policy)


    I have received several comments for my previous post, and I thank all of the commentators for the effort. I must say though, if only I set a prize for giving these comments, I would definitely give such prize to my brother, Prasetya Dwicahya, for his excellent comments (no family bias involved here). So if you have not read his comments, you better check it out before going further with this post.

    Anyway, most of what I will say has already been covered by Prasetya's comments. Thus, I'll focus instead in analyzing his proposed policy to find out whether such policy can be the best option to be pursued by the government. Prasetya's proposed policy is something that we call as the freedom of choice policy which is in line with the concept of free market and pareto efficiency (a condition where as a result of the policy, some individuals are made "better off" without making any individual to be "worse off"). People is free to choose whether they want to use the car without the safety device or bear an additional costs in order to install the safety device. The company is free to produce its products (even if there is a defect) provided that it discloses all material information to the public so that people can make an informed decision and the company can reduce its marginal costs. And the Government has the role to enforce the law to ensure that the company will pay the expected compensation to any victim of the car due to the unavailability of the safety device .

    Theoretically, this can be a win-win solution that promotes efficiency to the maximum. With this kind of policy, the costs of legal enforcement by the government would not be too expensive (assuming that the rate of accident is low in accordance with the probability that has been set out by the company), the company will not be burdened with huge additional costs, and the people will have many options to choose in order to maximize their utility and preference (i.e. getting an absolutely safe car or playing with the laws of probabilities for a huge jackpot). But it seems this is too good to be true. Or isn't it?  Or do you think this idea disgusts you, that it is a morally reprehensible choice? I mean, how do you even sure about letting people take a bet with their life in the line, even though the probability is very small?

    In practice, we let people take this kind of risk all the time. We know smoking is dangerous, yet we are not able to prohibit people from doing it. And suppose you say that there is a huge interest group behind smoking activities, there is even a better example which is more similar to the above car case. We know overeating and poor exercise are a good recipe for health problems and they also increase the probability of getting caught by various diseases, including heart attack. Yet, I bet that the government will not issue any law that prohibits people from overeating and force them to exercise routinely. My main question, if we care about our people (like in the case of the automobile company), why don't we just choose the path of regulating people's daily life? There are many answers to that: the enforcement costs will be too big, it's an invasion to people's privacy, it's another form of "big brother"/dictatorship, etc. Now, if we can give those lines of arguments to the overeating problem, shouldn't we take the same position for the problematic car?            

    What I would further argue is this, the above proposed policy that respects the element of freedom can potentially be the best option for the automobile case in any possible way. Let us tweak the case a little bit. Suppose now the probability of having an accident due to the unavailability of safety device is 80%, meaning that from 2,500,000 cars, 2,000,000 cars will go haywire. Will our proposed policy save the problem? Or should the government forces the automobile company to install the device? I would say there is no need for the government to do that. Using a simple costs and benefit analysis, the company will definitely realize that the costs of not having such safety device will be too big to be borne by the company. In this case, their best option is to install the safety device.

    Now, another tweak. Suppose the costs of installing the safety device is not US$10 per car, but US$100,000 dollar. Will our proposed policy work? I bet yes. In this case, the marginal costs of producing the car (i.e. the costs of producing an additional unit of the car) will defeat its marginal benefits. Simply saying, the automobile company will never produce the car in the first place.

    Having said the above, I need to put a caveat. Our world is very complex and a solution for a problem may not work for another problem. What I want to show here is how economics can be used as a handy tool in formulating our laws and policy. I'll continue to use this theme for my next articles and hopefully we can try to apply it in different cases with different policies. One thing for sure, this exercise should be fun.

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    Public Choice Theory and its Application in Indonesian Legislation System

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    Special Purpose Vehicle in Law and Economics Perspective

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    Legal Positivism and Law and Economics -- A Defense

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    Economic Analysis of Rape Crime: An Introduction

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